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IntroductIon
Models of decision making under uncer-
tainty should be grounded in general 
cognitive processes reflecting pervasive 
constraints from the nature of our envi-
ronment. Developing integrated models 
applicable across different tasks provides 
converging constraints that increase the 
predictiveness of models to new situations.
Decision making is such a rich discipline 
that it is often considered in relative iso-
lation, leading to entire fields devoted to 
specialized aspects and domains. Decision 
making under uncertainty can be better 
understood through the prism of general 
theories of cognition, constrained by rep-
resentations and mechanisms developed 
to account for the much broader range of 
human activities (Anderson and Lebiere, 
2003). This argument is an elaboration of 
Simon’s bounded rationality (e.g., Simon, 
1957) approach to constraining the ration-
ality of optimal decision making by the 
cognitive limitations of the decision maker. 
Further, those cognitive limitations, and 
more generally the entire decision making 
process, should be modeled in a computa-
tional framework that captures in detail not 
only the cognitive mechanisms and repre-
sentations involved (Newell, 1990) but also 
motivational processes (Kruglanski et al., 
2007; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011) as 
well as perceptual (especially attentional) 
and motor processes (Card et al., 1983) to 
reflect the constraints of the task environ-
ment. Finally, decision making involves 
not simply raw cognitive processes but 
also knowledge and strategies on how to 
approach the problem (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999). Fortunately, unified theories of cog-
nition enable the representation of declara-
tive and procedural knowledge constructs 
in a way that interacts with the constraints 
of the cognitive and perceptual processes 
to provide a rich account of performance 
in the task. Providing a detailed but unified 
computational account of those factors and 
their interaction across a wide range of tasks 
is essential for a deeper understanding of 
human decision making under uncertainty, 
as it involves general cognitive processes 
that are not limited to specific paradigms 
but take place across all human activities.
We illustrate those points by briefly 
describing a number of instances of our 
recent line of research in models of decision 
making. In particular, we want to highlight 
the importance of applying the same mode-
ling approach to widely different paradigms 
of decision making (including domains that 
are not usually considered part of decision 
making) in order to bring the maximum 
force of converging constraints onto the 
problem. Indeed, the main issue with many 
decision making tasks is not that they are 
too difficult to model, but instead that too 
many distinct models provide roughly 
equivalent accounts of the data, making it 
hard to determine which provide a funda-
mental understanding of human decision 
making processes and which are merely 
well-fitted parametric descriptions of 
human performance.
Models
Our initial model of decision making was 
applied to a task paradigm that is not tradi-
tionally considered part of decision making. 
Sequence-learning (e.g., Curran and Keele, 
1993) usually involves speeded reaction 
tasks intended to investigate the impact of 
implicit learning processes on the detection 
of event sequences. In those tasks, a par-
ticipant is exposed to a sequence of stimuli 
appearing in specific positions on a screen, 
and has to produce corresponding motor 
responses as quickly as possible. Given per-
ceptual and motor limitations such as the 
need to shift visual attention to process a 
stimulus and to prepare a motor response 
before executing it, anticipating the loca-
tion of the next stimulus and preparing the 
associated response allows for significantly 
faster reaction time. Learning in this task is 
measured by the improvement in response 
time between trial blocks in which the 
stimuli follow a repeated, deterministic 
sequence and those in which stimuli are 
randomly selected. Our sequence-learning 
model (Wallach and Lebiere, 2000; Lebiere 
and Wallach, 2001) works by building rep-
resentations (chunks) of small pieces of 
the stimulus sequence in working memory, 
storing them in long-term memory and 
retrieving them by matching to the most 
recent stimuli to predict the next item in 
the sequence. Perceptual–motor factors play 
an important role in this task as well, as the 
ability to learn the sequence and effectively 
use anticipation fundamentally depends 
upon the length of the interval between a 
response and the next stimulus. The model 
reproduces numerous behavioral measures, 
including average response times, probabil-
ity of errors and percentage of anticipatory 
actions. Constraining models using multi-
ple performance dimensions is essential to 
reducing degrees of freedom, a common 
problem in simple decision making tasks.
The essential feature of this model is 
its use of memories for specific experi-
ences. Different experiences compete to be 
retrieved for use through an activation cal-
culus that is based on the rational analysis 
of cognition (Anderson, 1990; Anderson 
and Schooler, 1991) of how the availabil-
ity of memories is determined by the sta-
tistical structure of the environment. This 
fundamental idea is that the mind makes 
micro-decisions in retrieving an experi-
ence on which to base its next action. This 
insight has played out in a series of subse-
quent applications of this model to tasks 
that similarly involves making a sequence 
of decisions and performing associated 
actions.
The approach was then applied to a clas-
sic multi-person game, paper rock scissors 
(PRS). Games constitute an excellent deci-
sion making testbed because of the natural 
competitive pressure to make the best pos-
sible decisions and maximize performance. 
PRS is a two-person game in which each 
player has to simultaneously select one of 
three options. The winner is determined by 
a circular relation between the three options, 
with no option intrinsically better than the 
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to learn the value of each option in isola-
tion despite, as in the first baseball experi-
ment, the lack of any sequential structure 
in the task. But while the recency effect 
seems to be a pervasive bias ingrained in 
human cognition, not all such cognitive 
biases are equally stable and permanent. 
Lebiere et al. (2007) showed how the very 
same recency effect in the activation of 
experiences, weighted against a longer-
term frequency effect, can explain the 
appearance and then disappearance of risk 
aversion bias in deciding between safe and 
risky choices. The recency effect initially 
dominates and leads selection away from 
risky choices, but the frequency effect then 
restores over time the balance between 
safe and risky options. This account is 
directly compatible with other sampling-
based explanations (e.g., Denrell and Le 
Mens, 2007; Le Mens and Denrell, 2011) 
but provides precise predictions of the 
time course of the learning and unlearn-
ing of the risk aversion bias as a function 
of experience.
The direct implication of our account 
of decision making under uncertainty is 
the lack of stable risk preferences. Instead, 
the model attempts to achieve the best 
possible performance under cognitive and 
task constraints (such as payoff function 
and other performance metrics) without 
explicitly considering second-order infor-
mation such as the amount of risk present 
in their decisions. In addition to the impact 
of learning and experience, cognitive factors 
influencing the level of risk assumed include 
individual differences parameters such as 
working memory capacity (Rehling et al., 
2004) and noise in memory retrieval (West 
and Lebiere, 2001) as well as information 
framing effects (Martin et al., 2011).
conclusIon
The application of the same model across 
a wide range of paradigms, from implicit 
learning of sequences to multi-person 
games in abstract and embodied settings to 
classical decision making tasks illustrates 
the predictive benefits of models based on 
cognitive architectures. Specifically, the 
cognitive constraints embedded in the 
architecture interact with the heuristic 
strategies used and the task environments 
to account for a broad pattern of results 
across multiple fields with limited param-
eter variations.
tion of pitch speed illustrates the pervasive 
nature of the biases inherited from the 
statistical structure of our environment. 
More fundamentally, it emphasizes that 
the concept of optimal decision making is 
relative to assumptions about the nature 
of the environment. For instance, prob-
ability matching, the common tendency to 
select choices in direct proportion to their 
quality, is often referred to as a suboptimal 
cognitive bias. However, that is only true if 
one assumes a fixed environment that one 
has adequately sampled. However, if one 
assumes a constantly changing environ-
ment, either independently or in response 
to our choices, probability matching can 
be an effective adaptive strategy to bal-
ance the need for constant sampling of the 
environment (exploration) with the goal to 
maximize performance given the currently 
available information (exploitation).
In the second experiment, pitch loca-
tion was varied to reflect the current sit-
uation (specifically the balls and strikes 
count) to reflect strategic pitch selection 
in actual baseball games. The model’s 
sensitivity to the context closely matched 
the strategic adaptivity of human batters. 
In both cases, the cognitive biases and 
mechanisms built into the architecture 
matched the human data a priori at least 
as well as a Hidden Markov model that had 
been trained on part of the data and could 
predict the rest a posteriori, emphasizing 
the role that cognitive constraints can 
play in modeling decision making biases 
in a principled, general basis rather than 
developing and parameterizing ad hoc, 
task-specific, models.
To demonstrate the relevance of the 
model to classical decision making para-
digms and the power of cognitive con-
straints to a priori predict performance, 
Stewart et al. (2009) submitted a version 
of the PRS model to a choice prediction 
competition. The choice model uses the 
blending mechanism (Lebiere, 1999) to 
generate continuous expectations of the 
outcome of each option, reflecting both 
their payoffs and probabilities. The model 
won the part of the competition in which 
decisions between safe and risky options 
were based on prior experience with those 
options (Erev et al., 2010). Particularly 
remarkable is the fact that the sequence-
learning model matched human perfor-
mance better than models that attempted 
others. Game theory prescribes random 
play as the optimal solution. However, 
while humans find it almost impossible to 
generate random actions, they find it quite 
natural to detect event sequences. Thus 
the sequence-learning approach is directly 
applicable to the iterated version of the 
game in which players engage in multiple 
rounds of play: the PRS model observes 
the opponent and learns small sequences 
of their moves in order to predict their next 
move, retrieves a best-matching sequence, 
and bases its move selection on that predic-
tion. The model (Lebiere and West, 1999; 
West and Lebiere, 2001) matches quite 
well both aggregate level of human per-
formance and specific characteristics such 
as the distribution of winning streaks. Its 
performance is also comparable to that 
of the best computer programs (Billings, 
2000), an indication that cognitive con-
straints on decision making can provide 
useful functionality. The main aspect of 
this and other games for purposes of deci-
sion making is that the environment is not 
static but is instead another dynamic cogni-
tive (human or model) entity adapting to 
one’s actions, thus binding the players in a 
relation of reciprocal causation exhibiting 
signal detection characteristics such as sto-
chastic resonance (West et al., 2005).
Sequential decision making is not con-
fined to abstract games or experiments but 
instead is a natural component of many 
everyday situations. The game of base-
ball, specifically the competition between 
pitcher and batter, features the same struc-
ture of repeated choice among a set of pos-
sible actions. As in PRS, the pitcher has a 
number of options at his disposal varying 
in speed, location and movement, and, as 
in sequence-learning, because of percep-
tual–motor constraints the batter needs to 
anticipate the pitcher’s choice in order to 
maximize the effectiveness of his response. 
Lebiere et al. (2003) applied the sequence-
learning approach to two experimental 
situations. In the first one, pitch speed 
varied randomly between trials. The base-
ball model exploited the impact of recency 
in the base-level activation of the chunks 
representing each pitch to reflect the ten-
dency of human batters to anticipate pitches 
similar to those they had seen recently. The 
fact that this pattern was observed in both 
humans and model despite the lack of any 
structure in the random trial-to-trial selec-
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However, work remains to be done to 
achieve true unification. Instantiations of 
the model across paradigms still require 
the modeler to implement representation 
choices that reflect the nature of the task. 
A key part of decision making involves not 
only applying given heuristics and strate-
gies, but also the metacognitive task of 
selecting among them and adopting the 
proper representation to implement them. 
Only when that aspect of decision making is 
viewed as an integral part of decision mak-
ing and incorporated in models will a true 
theory of the field be achieved.
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